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CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN EMINENT
DOMAIN IN PENNSYLVANIA.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is the taking
of private property for a public use. If we use the word "take"
in its strictly narrow sense as meaning a dispossession, we will
find that the damages inflicted by the exercise of the power may
be classified under the following headings:
A. Damages to the property actually taken by the exercise
of the power, in which case we must distinguish between the
taking of the whole and the taking of a part, and between dam-
ages caused by the construction and by the operation of the
public use.
B. Damages to -property not taken, caused by the taking
of property in the vicinity, in which case the property may or
may not abut upon the property takeri, and where we must dis-
tinguish again between damages caused by the construction and
damages caused by the operation.
C. Damages to- abutting and non-abutting owners caused
by the disturbance of a public highway by (i) change of grade,
(2) construction and operation of (a) the works of a pri-
vate corporation, (b) of a sewer. This disturbance of the
public highway may or may not involve the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Where there is merely a change of
grade, there is no taking. When a private corporation occupies
the highway, there sometimes is an additional servitude, and,
to that extent, a taking. In this case, also, we hmust distinguish
between damages caused by construction and damages caused
by the operation of the public use. B. and C. are commonly
referred to as consequential damages, and the distinction be-
tween them is of some practical importance.
The term "consequential," although deeply embedded in the
law by constant use, is unfortunate in this connection because
it has no bearing on the real distinction between these different
kinds of damage. All damages are consequential in the proper
sense of the word, that 'is, following upon the doing of the
injurious act. The distinction between direct and consequential,
if there be any, seems really to be a distinction between less
and more remote damages. The distinction is entirely of fact,
impossible of a rational definition, and involves a question,
(S1)
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practical rather than theoretical, of where to stop in the chain
of causation. A few instances of the different meanings attrib-
uted to the word "conseqtuential' are collected in the note."
The distinction which has been drawn in the law of eminent
domain between consequential and direct damage requires for
its understanding some attention to a phase of the law which
is now obsolete as a matter of practical importance. The con-
stitutions of 1776, 179o and 1838 provided in language practi-
cally identical,* at least no distinction has been drawn in this
connection, that no man's property shall be taken for a public
use without his consent or that of his representatives.'
The constitutional provision was construed by the Supreme
Court 4 to impose a liability only for damage to the property
I The word "consequential" has been used as meaning (i) damages aris-
ing from the breach of covenants in a deed. Duncan, J., in Funk v. Voneida,
it S. & R. iog at 111 (1824). (2) Damages to upper riparian owner on a
canal caused by water raised by a dam. Freeland v. Railroad Co., 66 Pa. 91
(i87o). (3) Damages caused by diminishing flow of water in a private
stream passing lower riparian owner. Lycoming Gas & Water Co. v. Moyer,
99 Pa. 15 (1882), semble. See Shenandoah Co:s App., 2 W. N. C. 47
(1875), contra. (4) Damages arising from diversion of flow of surface
water. Moser, J., in Stepp v. Lenger, 25 D. R. 463 (1916). In Pittsburg v.
Scott, i Pa. 309 at 32o (i845), Rogers, J., said in speaking of damage done
by a nuisance that a distinction was taken in England between direct and
consequential damage, which distinction was repudiated here.
*"Nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without
the consent of his representatives and without just compensation being
made." Art. 9, Sec. V, Constitution of ixgo; Art. 9, Sec.. X, Constitution
of 1838.
'Since the provisions in a State constitution are merely prohibitive and
all powers not limited are left unaffected except in so far as is provided in
the Federal constitution, as to which no question arises in this connection, it
follows that under this clause the State can take for a private use without
restraint. Although this argument was called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, it did not prevail; see remarks of Gibson, C. J., in Harvey v. Thomas,
1o Watts 3 at 67 (i84o); and the Court in effect amended the constitutioft
by construing the provisions to altogether prohibit the taking for a private
use. See remarks of Elkin, J., in Phila. Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., 2z Pa.
3o5 at 309 (1915). The provision also destroys the power of eminent
domain altogether, because under it property could not be taken without the
consent of the owner or his representatives. This, however, was entirely
overlooked. -
"For a history of the doctrine in Pennsylvania, see able opinion of
Thayer, P. J., in Patent v. Railroad Co., 14 W. N. C. 545 (1884) at 547,
et seq.. where the learned judge pointed out that the doctrine originated in
the case of Phila. and Trenton R. R. Co, 6 Whart. 25 (i84o), where Chief
Justice Gibson confined the meaning of the word "take" as used in the
constitutional provision "that no man's property shall be taken
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taken, using the word "take" 5 as meaning an actual disposses-
sion.
The legislature inight, however, in authorizing the exercise
of the power of.eminent domain impose a greater liability for
damage than that arising under the strict construction of the
constitution which had been adopted, and such seems to have
been the general practice.6
without just compensation" to an actual seizure of property, and therefore
when the injury extended only to the depreciation of the property without a
taking, the constitution afforded no protection. As pointed out by Houston,
J., dissenting in Monongahela Nay. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. Toi (1843), the
clause in the Constitution of 1838, which provided that every man, for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, etc., shall have a remedy by due course
of law, was comprehensive enough to cover the plaintiff's case and confer
the right to recover consequential damages. Strangely enough, however, the
argument of Gibson, C. J., prevailed, and the constitutional aspect of the law
was not remedied until the adoption of the Constitution of 1874. Although
the grounds of decision are not clearly indicated by Gibson, C. J., they were
probably as follows: The clause prohibiting a taking without just compen-
sation is merely prohibitive, and since a taking is a dispossession, there is
nothing in the Constitution to prohibit an injury 6r destruction without just
compensation.
"Mere putting on a plan or laying out of a street not a taking, District
of City of Pittsburgh, 2 NV. & S. 320 (184!), see, however, Philadelphia
Parkway, 25o Pa. 257 (I915), even though by statute the owner cannot
recover damages for the taking of buildings subsequently erected within the
lines of the located street. Bush v. the City, 166 Pa. 57 (895). Diminish-
ing the flow of water in a private stream opposite the land of a lower
riparian owner is a taling. Shenandoah Co.'s App., 2 W. N. C. 47 (1875);
Lycoming Gas & Water Co. v. Moyer, 99 Pa. 615 (882), semble, contra.
In Dobbins v. Brown, 12 Pa. 75 (1849), it was held that the covenant of
general warranty was not broken by a taking in eminent domain for a public
canal, since the eviction was not a dispossession, as it left a qualified use and
possession in the owrner. Extension of cross arms of a telegraph pole across
land is a taking. Young v. Electric Traction Company, 32 Pa. C. C. R. 8i
(igo6). Closely connected with the meaning of the word "take" is the
conception of the nature of the estate in the land taken, acquired by the
proceedings in eminent domain. As the statutes in eminent domain are
generally silent as to the nature of the estate acquired, several theories have
been advanced: () That the interest is an easement; if so, it must be an
easement in gross, as there is no dominant tenement, and the entire fee of
the soil must remain in the former owner during the existence of the ease-
ment in the public use. (2) That the estate is a modified fee. If so, it
must be a determinable fee [see Foulke, Rule Against Perpetuities in Penna.
(igog), Sec. 28], and the entire ownership is vested in the public use, the
former owner having only a possibility of reverter so long as the use exists.
(3) If the statute so provides, the interest may be a fee simple absolute.
Railroad Co. v. Bruce, 722 Pa. 23 (1883).
"'Notwithstanding, then, some prior difference of opinion, it may now
be taken as the ascertained rule that the lawmakers may legally omit a
provision for merely consequential damages when creating a corporation to
construct an improvement for the common benefit. But, I think, such was not
the popular impression, and it is certain that, governed either by constitu-
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PUBLIC RIVERS.
The title to the bed and waters of a public or navigable
stream between low water marks is in the Commonwealth and
the title of the riparian owners stops with this shore line. When
the Commonwealth grants the right to use pr obstruct such a.
river, there is no exercise of the power of eminent domain be-
cause no private property it taken.7 A number of these cases turn-
ing on riparian righis are frequently cited in discussions of conse-
quential damages, although they strictly speaking, are not in
point. Where the use which a riparian owner was making of a
public stream was interfered with by anything done on the stream
tinder grant from the Commonwealth, it was a case of damnuin
absque injuria, because the owner had no legal right in the
stream. Thus it was held that a riparian owner could not re-
cover damages for interference with a ford,8 fishery,9 spring
tional scruples, or actuated by a sense of common justice, our legislature have
always directed payment for consequential injuries suffered by the landholder
from the making of public highways or other like works. I say always; for
the very few instances where this has been omitted among the numerous acts
of this character which load the statute books, scarcely deserve to be esteemed
exceptions." Bell, J, in Mifflin v. Railroad Co., 16 Pa. 182 at 193
(1851). In these cases arising before the Constitution of 1874, the liability
for consequential damages was sustained on the language of the act of
incorporation or act authorizing the doing of the act in question. Mifflin v.
Railroad Co., x6 Pa. 182 (i85i); Schuylkill Nay. Co. v. Loose, T9 Pa. 15.
(1852) ; Union Canal Co. v. Keiser, i9 Pa. 134 (1852) ; Buckwalter v. Bridge
Co.. 38 Pa. 281 (861); Koch v. Water Co., 65 Pa. 288 (1870); Bald Eagle
Boom Co. v. Sanderson, 8iY2 Pa. 4o2 (1876); Lycoming Gas & Water Co. v.
Moyer, 99 Pa. 6x5 (t882).
'There is language in the books from which it appears that it was
supposed that the power of eminent domain was involved when the legis-
lature granted rights in a public stream. Strong, J., in Clarke v. Bridge Co.,
41 Pa. r47 at x58 (1862).
'Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co., i W. & S. 346 (1841); statutory pro-
ceedings. The water from the ford was deepened by the construction of a
dam under authority of an Act of Assembly.
* Shrunk v. Navigation Co., 74 S. & R. 71 (I&6) ; statutory broceedings.
Fishery in Schuylkill River destroyed by construction of a dam lower down
the river. Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter involved a fishery in the Delaware
River and was an action on the case against another riparian owner for de-
stroying the fishery by extending the wharf into the river under licefise from
the port wardens. On the first appeal in 61 Pa. 21 (1869) a verdict for the
plaintiff for $1217 reduced to $80o was reversed, in an opinion by Sharswood,
J., principally on the ground that it was a case of dainnuin absque injuria. On
second appeal, 61 Pa. 35 (1870), a verdict for the plaintiff for $35 was again
reversed on the ground principally that the plaintiff could have no pre-
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situate below highwater mark,10 or a mill race,'' when the
damage was caused by a corporation lawfully occupying the
river under grant from the Commonwealth.
Where a traveler on a public river suffered damage by an
obstruction in the river placed there under grant from the Legis-
lature, he was not entitled to recover,1 2 unless liability was ex-
pressly imposed by the act authorizing construction of the
bridge 13 or dam. 14 Where, however, the obstruction was erected
without authority of law there was a nuisance and a right of re-
covery accordingly."'
scriptive right in the fishery. On third appeal, in 77 Pa. 310 0875), a verdict
for the defendant was reversed, as the court below erred in holding that
the evidence of the derivation of the plaintiff's title was insufficient, and on
the fourth and final appeal, in go Pa. 85 (1879), a verdict for the plaintiff
for $426 was again reversed on the same grounds substantially as laid down
in the first appeal.
"Commonwealth v. Fisher, i P..& W. 462 (183o); spring situate below
high water mark'on the Susquehanna River flooded because of the construe
tion of the State Canal. See remarks of Thayer, P. J., in Patent v. The
Railroad Co., 14 W. N. C. s4s (1884). at 547.
" McKeen v. Canal Co. 49 Pa. 424 (865); action on the case. Canal
Company by raising dam caused water to flow back into plaintiff's mill race
situate on the Lehigh River. The case is obscurely reported. A verdict for
the plaintiff was affirmed, although the reasoning of the Court was against
his right to recover. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. ol
(1&43) ; action on the case. Plaintiff had erected a mill in the Youghiogeny
River under Dam Act of 18o3 and was damaged by defendant's construction
of a dam in the Monongahela River. The Act of 18o3, the Court said, merely
gave the riparian owners a revocable license to erect dams. This seems to
be the leading case on the question of exemption from liability for conse-
quential damages, but does not exactly raise the point, as the plaintiff had
no property right at all which was injured, and therefore the question of
whether there was a constitutional liability for consequential damages was
not reached in the case.
' In Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Kirk. 46 Pa. 112 (1863), and Clarke v.
Birmingham-Pittsburgh Bridge Co., 41 Pa. 147 (x86i), a navigator in the
stream was held unable to recover damages in an action on the case against
the Bridge Co. for loss of a boat wrecked on the piers of the bridge, as the
river was public and the property of the state. See, however, remarks of
Thayer, P. J., in Patent v. The Railroad Company, 14 W. N. C. 54S (184)
at 547.
"Dugan v. Bridge Co., 27 Pa. 303 (1856).
", Bcon v. Arthur, 4 Watts 437 (1835).
" In Hughes v. Heiser, I Binney 463 (x8o8), the plaintiff was navigating a
public river with rafts and was prevented from passing a certain point by a
dam erected by the defendant. The case was, therefore, that of an obstruc-
tion of a public highway, as the dam was built contrary to law. The only
point involved appeared to be whether the plaintiff had suffered such special
damage as entitled him to sue for damages caused by the nuisance. It was
held that he could recover, as he had suffered special damage, and that it
was immaterial whether it was immediate or consequential.
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In Malone v. The City,'6 there was an action on the case
against the City of Philadelphia to recover damage for the
erection and maintenance of a sewer which carried sewage into
the dock adjoining plaintiff's wharf, filling it up and making
it unfit for navigation. The nonsuit was affirmed on appeal.
The Act of February 25, x86i,"- authorized councils to build
the sewer into the Delaware River and the mouth of it went
to low water line, beyond which plaintiff's title did not go,
and consequently the- nuisance was in a river which belonged
to the Commonwealth, and for which the plaintiff could not
recover. It was also said that a municipal corporation was not
liable for consequential damages to private property unless the
liability was imposed by statute."
ADJOINING OWNERS PRIOR TO 1874.
An adjoining owner whose land was not taken had no right
to recover damages for injuries inflicted 1)y the corporation
exercising the power of eminent domain on his neighbor's land
in the absence of negligence or of a statutory provision impos-
ing the liability.
In Railroad Co. v. Young, 19 a riparian owner brought an
action on the case against the railroad company to recover dam-
ages arising from the construction of defendant's railroad along
the bank of the Susquehanna River. The railroad company
cut into a bluff on one side of the river, and had to construct
an embankment out into the stream thus diverting a portion of
the water from the plaintiff's mill which was situated below on
142 Penna. 37 (882).
"P. L 43.
"The following cases, although frequently cited, contain only dicta as to
consequential damages: Reitenbaugh v. R. R. Co., 21 Pa. boo (1853). Statu-
tory proceedings under Act of 1849 to assess damages for the construction of
a railroad. Woodward, J., in the Supreme Court, said, at p. 1o5, "What
damage is to be considered consequential and not direct is a question which
the adjudged cases must answer, and which I will not discuss here because
it does not arise out of the report before us." Yealy v. Finlk, 43 Pa. 212
(1862), trespass against township- supervisors personally. Judgment for
defendants, as they were not personally liable for damages caused by acts
done-honestly in exercise of the discretion given them by law.
1833 Pa. 175 (1850).
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the same side of the river. The plaintiff had a right to erect
the mill dam in a navigable stream under the Act of March 23,
1803,20 and did not own the land where the cutting took place.
The defendant was a foreign railroad company acting under
authority of the Act of February 16, 1841.21 A verdict for the
plaintiff was reversed on appeal as the plaintiff's claim was not
for the taking but for the consequential injury for which the
defendant was not liable under the Act of Assembly. Further-
more, the plaintiff had, under the mill dam act, only a license
which the state had the right to revoke. Since in this case the
plaintiff had no right upon which to found his action, the de-
cision does not clearly raise the point. It is useful, however, as
it illustrates the proposition involved. In Canal .Co. v. Mud-
liner, 2 2 the plaintiff brought an action on the case against the
canal company for damages caused by the flooding of his cellar
and injury to the walls of the house because the defendants
raised the water of the canal, and it was held that he could not
recover in the absence of negligence or wantonness.
DAMAGES TO REST OF TRACT WHERE PART IS TAKEN.
We shall now consider the case where part of a tract is
taken, which generally occurs where there is a right of
way of a railroad or a public road. In these cases the
court considers the tract as a whole and endeavors to ascertain
what damage is inflicted upon it by the taking of the
part, and in doing this uses as a measure of damage the differ-
ence in market value of the whole tract as affected by the con-
struction and as unaffected by the construction. Strictly speak-
ing, however, this principle does not touch the real issue. The
corporation takes a strip of land and that particular strip only
is taken, and the first inquiry probably is-what damages are
caused by the taking of that strip of land, that is, what is that
strip of land worth, what is the basis upon which ordinary men
-P.I. j99.
n P. L. 28.
268 Pa. 357 (1871).
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would consider the matter if a sale were being made of the
strip and the compulsory taking in eminent domain is nothing
more or less than a compulsory sale. In addition to this damage
caused by the taking, there are damages inflicted upon the rest
of the tract of land. These damages are damages to land not
taken and are really and strictly speaking consequential dam-
ages. The circumstance, however, that they are consequential
damages has been overlooked.
In Watson v. Railroad Co., 2 3 the court said that the dam-
age was to the tract as a whole, even though part was occupied,
and the charter in the case at bar directed the viewers to esti-
mate "the injury or damage sustained," and to take into con-
sideration the advantages that would be derived by the owner
from the railroad. "The inconvenience arising from division
or from increased difficulty of access and the cost of additional
necessary fencing are alike the direct and immediate result of
the construction of the road."
In Gilmore V. Railroad Co.,24 proceedings were had under
the Act of February 19, 1849,25 to assess damages for the con-
struction of a railroad. Evidence offered to cover the following
points was held properly ruled out: (i) that the premises had
been endangered by fire; (2) that the property is endangered
by fire; (3) that since the road was opened the fence on each
side has repeatedly been on fire; (4) that the jury may not
give damages for any probable accidents or fires in the future.
It was held, however, that all the injuries may be considered
which would result probably and naturally from the reasonable
and usual operation of the road.28  The court also held that
damages could be recovered for destruction to growing crops
planted between location and construction, although with knowl-
edge of the property owner.
337 Pa. 469 at 48o-81 (x86r).
"104 Pa. 275 (1883).
'P. I- M
' The reference by the court to the provisions of Art. 16, Sec. 8, seems
to have nothing to do with the case.
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In Railroad Company v. Hummel,=7 in statutory proceed-
ings to assess damages for the taking of part of a tract for
the right of way for a railroad, the jury of view included an
item of damage which might arise from accidental fire in the
ordinary operation of the road excluding damage from care-
lessness. On appeal the judgment was reversed so far as it
confirmed the report as to this item.
DAMAGES TO ABUTTING AND NoN-ABUTTING OWNERS BY DIs-
TURBANCE OF PUBLIC HIGHWAY.
We shall next consider the case of damages to abutting
and non-abutting owners by disturbance of a public highway,
the only two instances of which coming within the scope of the
discussion were, (a) construction and operation of a railroad,
(b) change of grade.
The law was that a railroad company lawfully occupying
a public street was not liable for damages to abutting property
owners in the absence of negligence and any statutory provision
imposing a liability. It was held that there was no taking of
land even if the abutting owners owned the bed of the
street in fee; that the legislature merely authorized a change in
the mode of the use of the street, and it was a case of damnum
absque injuria
2
The Act of February i9, 1849,21 imder which railroads
generally have been and are still constructed, provides that when
the company shall locate its road in and upon any street or alley
in a city or borough, compensation shall be made to abutting
327 Pa. 99 (856)-
I Phila. & Trenton R. R. Co., 6 Whart. 25 (i84o), statutory proceedings
to assess damages. Exceptions to report of viewers that they refused to bear
evidence of damages to private property owners (probably refers to abutting
owners) by reason of the location of the road, were dismissed. In Mercur jr.
Railroad Company, 36 Pa. 99 (x859), and Faust v. Railroad Company, 3
Phila. 64 (i858), s. C. 25 L. 1. 221, bill of abutting owner for an injunction
was dismissed. Snyder v. Railroad Company, 5s Pa. 34o (x86), statutory
proceedings, report of viewers awarding damages to abutting owners set
aside on exceptions. The defendant moved its tracks in the street nearer to
plaintiff's house. Struthers v. Railroad Company, 87 Pa. 2& (1874), trespass
on the case; judgment for the defendant.
" P. L'79, Se- io.
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owners for damages caused by any excavation or embankment
made in the construction of the road.
30 The same Statute 3 1
also provides that the railroad may occupy the whole of a coun-
try road upon constructing a new one in its stead.
32
In case of special charters provision was frequently made
as to occupancy of streets and duty of the railroad. 3'
It was clearly the law, prior to the Constitution of 1874,
that a city or borough changing the grade of a road incurred no
liability for damages to the abutting owner, in the absence of
statutory provision,34 and that a private corporation changing
the grade of a street was in like manner exempt
3 5
CONSTITUTION OF 1874 AND ITS AFFECT.
The Constitution of 1874, Article I6, Section 8, provides as
follows:
"Municipal and other corporations, and individuals invested"
with the privilege of taking private property for public use, shall
make just compensation for property taken, injured,37 or destroyed
"Railroad Company v. Rose, 74 Pa. 362 (x873); Railroad Company v.
McChesney, 85 Pa. 522 (1878); Railroad y. Rhoadarmer, 107 Pa. 214 (1884);
Duke v. Railroad Company, 129 Pa. 42z (1889); Seipel v. Railroad Company,
129 Pa. 425 (1889).
I See. x3.
"As to which see Philips v. the Railroad Company, 78 Pa. I77 (1875),
where ejectment was brought by an abutting owner for the bed of a road
occupied by the tracks and abandoned. Sugar Creek Township v. Railroad
Company, 242 Pa. 573 (39r4).
See charter referred to in Mercur v. The Railroad Company, 36 Pa.-99
at i02 089s).
" Green v. Borough of Reading, 9 Watts 382 (1842), probably the first
case. O'Conner v. Pittsburgh, z8 Pa. 187 (1851); In re Ridge Street, 29 Pa.
391 (1857).
" Henry v. Bridge Company, 8 W. & S. 85 (1844).
"As to the application of the section to corporations created before its
adoption, see Railroad Co. v. Patent, 17 W. N. C. 198 (z885); affd. s. c.
14 W. N. C. 545 (1848) ; Railroad Co. v. Duncan, 'II Pa. 352 (1886).
'In Edmundson v. The Railroad Company, ii Pa. 316 (1885), where
the company acquired the right of way by deed and it was held that they
were not liable for negligence of an independent contractor in construction
of the works. Gordon, J., at 320, said: "The words 'injured or destroyed,'
as found in this section, as everyone knows, was not designed to change,
alter, or limit the nature and effect of corporate contracts, but to impose on
those having the right of eminent domain a liability for consequential damages
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by the construction or enlargement of their works, highways or
improvements, which compensation shall be paid or secured before
such taking, injury or destruction. The General Assembly is
hereby prohibited from depriving any pcrson of an appeal from
any preliminary assessment of damages against any such corpora-
tions or individuals, made by views or otherwise; and the amount
of such damages, in all cases of appeal, shall, on the demand of
either party, be determined by a jury, according to the course of
the common law."
Municipal and other corporations and individuals vested
with the power to take private property for public use are sub-
ject to the liability imposed by the clause. It is only necessary
for the Legislature to grant the power of eminent domain in
order that the Constitution may apply. It was only corpora-
tions, etc., invested with the power of eminent domain who were
exempt from the ordinary rule of liability before and it was
therefore only necessary to specify them. The Commonwealth
is obviously invested with the power of eminent domain as part
of its sovereignty, but is probably not liable under this section
as it may not be sued without its consent. No decision on the
from which they have been previously exempt. If. a natural person, in the
exercise of a right on his own land, cut off the water of a creek or other
stream, from his neighbor below, or backed it upon his neighbor above, or if
in the lawful use of a highway, such person by any means injured the
property of an adjacent owner, he was responsible for the damages; but
previous to the present constitution, a corporation possessing the right of
eminent domain was not so liable. To create a liability for injuries of this
kind, ahd to make corporations responsible for such damages, was the object,
and the only object, of the section under discussion. This is obvious enough
from the concluding words thereof, "which compensation shall be paid or
secured before such taking, injury, or destruction," for though consequential
injuries may be anticipated and compensated, those or-ginating from care-
lessness or neglect, as they cannot be foreseen, neither can the damages
resulting from them be in advance measured or provided for." Paxson, C. J.,
in Railroad Company v. Walsh, 124 Pa. 544 at 55 (1889), said: "Our latest
case is P. R. R. v. Marchant, in which it was held that the word 'injury (or
injured) as used in Sec. 8, Art. 14, of the Constitution means such a legal
wrong as would be the subject of an action for damages at common law, that
for such injuries both corporations and individuals now stand upon the same
plane of responsibility." Gordon, J., in Railroad Company v. Lippincott,
16 Pa. 472 at 483 (1887), said: "We agree that over and beyond the dam-
ages which arise from a taking of property, whether in the shape of land
or a right, the constitution does impose on corporations a direct responsi-
bility for every injury for which a natural person would be liable at common
law. so we have held in the case of Edmundson v. Railroad Co., ITT Pa. 316
(1885), and to this doctrine we adhere."
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point has been found. A county is liable under this clause in
the Constitution.
38
Boroughs are invested with the power of eminent domain
and are clearly subject to the provisions of the section. In
Borough of Sirasburg v. Bachman,:"" an ordinance was passed
by the borough authorizing the street committee to cut drains
across private property near streets and prescribing a penalty
upon any owner who should stop up a drain so cut. The de-
fendant was sted for violating the ordinance and a verdict for
him was affirmed on appeal. The court said that the ordinance
was invalid in violativn Article 16, Sec. 8, because it contained
no provision for compensation for property injured.39
Townships not having the power of eminent domain were
held kxcmpt from liability for damages for change 6f grade,
391
but are now liable under Act of May 28, 1913.40 Townships
might just as well have been brought within the clause by simpiy
vesting them with a power of eminent domain. In the case of
Marshall v. Township of Lower Towamensing, an action of
trespass q. c. f. was brought against a township for damages
caused by the supervisors entering on the plaintiff's land and
taking gravel for the construction of a road, no payment or
security being made or given. The court entered judgment for
the defendant and wrote a very obscure opinion. The case
seems to decide that entry of the supervisors was not illegal,
and therefore trespass q. c. f. would not lie, but that the town-
ship would be liable for the gravel taken anyway, under Article
i6, Sec. 8 of the constitution. The remedy against the town-
'County of Chester v. Brown, 117 Pa. 647 (1888), action of trespass,
affirming i Pa. C. C. 1 (i885), overruling dictum of Elwell, J, in Freeze v.
Columbia County, 6 W. N. C. 145 at 147 (x879).
n'21 W. N. C. 462 0887).
'It was contended in one case, without success, however, and so held
by the court below, that a borough was not liable for consequential damages
because it was not under any statute invested with the power of eminent
domain. Hendrick's App., 1o3 Pa. 3s8 (8,83), grounds of reversal not clear.
" Wagner v. Salzberg Township, 132 Pa. 636 (189o) ; Shoe v. Township,
31 Pa. Super. Ct. 137 (1896).
" P. L. 368. This act is retrospective. Miller v. Township, 42 Pa. C. C.
R. 579 (1914).
41 15 W. N. C. 235 (1883).
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ship, therefore, probably was by an action of trespass on the
case, yet we have seen that townships were not liable for con-
sequential damages.
A bill for an injunction against threatened consequential
damage will be dismissed,4- as the liability imposed by the con-
stitution is for an actual physical injury and not for a threatened
injury. An injunction may, however, issue to restrain the prose-
cution of the work until compensation has been paid or secured.
We propose now to consider the effect of the Constitution
of 1874 upon the liability for the different kinds of damages
mentioned at the beginning of this article.4 s  The somewhat
peculiar case of interference with the use of a public river al-
ready referred to should first be disposed of.
PUBLIC RIVER CASES SINCE 1874.
The cases since the Constitution of 1874 are as fol-
lows: In Railroad Company v. Jones,44 the plaintiff had in
1863 been granted a right to a ferry across a public
river. The defendant railroad company coistructed a bridge
which interfered with access to the landing from the ferry,
which landing, appears to have been situate in a public
street; the plaintiff also introduced evidence to show that he had
leased a portion of the bank of the river for his landing. It
! Delaware County's App., i 9 Pa. t59 (888). In this case an injunction
was refused to restrain county commissioners from the erection of a new
bridge wholly within the lines of the old bridge and a public roadway.
Plaintiff alleged that the bridge was being constructed in a manner that
would be injurious to his right. Patterson's App., i29 Pa. iog (1889). In
this case a preliminary injunction was dissolved, as it did not appear how the
ulaintiff was injured.
'For convenience of reference the classification will be repeated here.
(A) Damages to the property actually taken by construction and
operation-taking of whole, taking of part.
(B) Damages to property not taken caused by taking in the vicinity
-- construction and operation.
(C) Damages to abutting and non-abutting owners by disturbance
of a public highway.
x. Change of grade.
2. Construction and operation of the works of a corporation.
3. Construction of sewers.
"I I Pa. 204 (x885).
64 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
was held, in an action on the case, that the plaintiff could re-
cover as lessee the depreciation in the market value of the lease
for the landing, but could recover nothing for the injury to the
ferry franchise or for interference with the landing on a public
street. In neither of which latter cases did Article 16, Section
8 apply, because no wrong was done the plaintiff as he had no
legal right either to the ferry or the use of the street.
In Butcher's Ice & Coal Company v. Philadelphia,45 a
riparian owner on the Delaware River recovered damages in an
action of trespass under Article i6, Section 8, for interference
with the use of his wharf caused by deposits from a sewer con-
structed by the defendant. In this case there was an interfer-
ence with the riparian use of the bank, which is and always has
been private property. A riparian owner has the same right of
access to the stream as an abutting owner on a street has to the
highway.
In Walnut Street Bridge, Philadelphia's Appeal,48 the City
-of Philadelphia constructed a bridge across the Schuylkill River
on the line of Walnut Street in such a way asto destroy all
access to the wharf of a riparian owner by masted vessels. In
statutory proceedings the jury of view found that the property
had been depreciated in market value by the construction of the
bridge. Exceptions to the report of the viewers were dismissed
by the court, which ruling was on appeal, confirmed. The Su-
preme Court held that the acts of February 7, 1818, 4 and of
April 9, 1835,48 conferred upon private riparian owners the
right to construct wharves upon banks of the Delaware and
Schuylkill rivers within the city limits, by which acts a private
right of property was conferred which could not be invaded by
the commonwealth or city without compensation being made;
that since the adoption of the Constitution of 1874 a mere in-
jury conferred a right to compensation, and that the facts in
the present case showed a substantial injury.
"5 156 Pa. 54 (1893).
19, Pa. 153 (1899).
47 Si. L. 34.
41P. L. 127.
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In Frecland v. Railroad Company,4 * the title of the ripar-
ian owner between high and low water mark was interfered
with by the construction of the railroad on the other side, chang-
ing the course of the stream. The recovery in trespass was al-
lowed without any discussion of the form of action or of con-
sequential damages.
No other case since the Constitution of i874 has been
found. In the case of Railroad v. Jones,9 where the property
owner had no legal right in the river, it was held that he was
not protected by Article i6, Section 8, of the Constitution. In
the other two cases, 50 the property owner had a legal right in
the bank of the river which was injured by the construction of
the works complained of.
DAMAGES TO PROPERTY ACTUALLY TAKEN.
Where the whole tract is taken, no question arises. The
damages are simply the market value of the property at the
time of the taking. Where a part only is taken, there is an
element of damage to the part not taken, which may be properly
called consequential. All such damages were, however, generally
recoverable before the Constitution of 1874, as we have seen;
under legislative provisions and under the application of the
rule of law fixing the measure of damages, which is the differ-
ence between the value before and after the taking. In the
application of this rule, the law takes into consideration many
elements of damage to the rest of the tract which may properly
be called consequential. It will be noted that in this case, in
the case of railroad companies, damages are recoverable arising
from the operation of the road."'
1 97 Pa. 529 (ToI).
I II Pa. 204 (1885).
SButcher's Coal Co. v. Phila., i56 Pa. 54 0893); Walnut Street Bridge,
Phila.'s App., i91 Pa. i53 0899). In Freeland v. Railroad Company, x97 Pa.
529 (igoi), the question was not discussed.
n Baker v. Railroad Company, 236 Pa. 479 (1912). The consideration of
all the items cognizable in such cases lies outside the scope of this discussion.
The case of damage from operation is referred to for the sake of pointing
out the distinction in such cases between the damages to the rest of the land
on one hand, and on the other, damage to adjoining and abutting owners
in streets.
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The distinction between the case where there is a taking
of part of the property, and the damage to the rest is to be
considered, and the case where the damage is to land no part
of which is taken, must be carefully borne in mind. There are
several cases in which this distinction does not at first clearly
appear and are likely to give trouble unless carefully examined.
In Northern Ccntral Railroad Co. v. Holland,52 the rail-
road company occupied a strip of ground between the plaintiffs
house and the street. The plaintiff had a right of way over this
strip of ground to the street. The building of the road destroyed
or materially interfered with the easement, and such interfer-
ence was unquestionably a taking in the strict sense, and there-
fore let in the question of damages to the rest of the tract, that
is, the tract of ground to which the right of way was appurte-
nant. In this view of the case the objection that there tould be
no recovery in an action of trespass was probably well taken.53
The damages from noise and smoke, therefore, were considered
in this case because there was a taking of part of the tract
injured, to wit, the appurtenant right of way.
In Snyder v. Lancaster,"4 the chief damage to the plain-
tiff's lot was caused by the removal of an adjoining house, which
removal was caused by the opening of a street. There were pro-
ceedings before the viewers, and it was held that the entire
damages to the plaintiff's lot were to be considered. The open-
ing of the street took off the rear end of the lot, and conse-




" 117 Pa. 613 (1888).
The language of the court below, on p. 62z, in -charging the jury, puts
the case very well, as follows: "They are liable to this action on the case
for interruption of easements and for consequential damages arising there-
from, and for the inconveniences and annoyances of the noise and smoke, and
cinders, and dangers to ingress and egress from proximity under the circum-
stances of this case as elements of damage, in the depreciation of the value
of the property."
2o W. N. C. 184 (1887).
